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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 11943

DOUGLAS JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Douglas Johnson, appeals from his
:onviction of Murder in the First Degree in violation of
Jtah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953), on jury trial in the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County,
State of Utah; the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson presided.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation of leniency, and the appellant was sentenced to
life imprisonment at the Utah State Prison.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crime of murder
in the first degree by information filed in the Third

Jdicial District Court in and for Tooele County on May
9, 1969.

Appellant was arraigned on June 9, 1969, and

plea of not guilty and "not guilty by reason of insanty11 was entered.

Trial by jury began on September 22,

969, and concluded on September 24, 1969.

The jury

ound the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree
ith a recommendation for leniency.

Judge Aldon J.

nderson entered judgment upon the verdict and sentenced
he appellant to life imprisonment at the Utah State
'rison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that the conviction be reersed, and a new trial granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is only one fact which is pertinent to the
ssue raised in this appeal.
On March 25, 1969, Douglas Johnson shot and killed
:wendolyn Johnson on the main street of the city of
'ooele, Utah.

The appellant has never denied that fact.

!is plea was not guilty, but his defense was based on
insanity and diminished responsibility.
The laws of Utah are concerned with questions of
legree, punishment, and treatment.
-2-

Evidence was offered

5

to insanity, diminished responsibility, and possibly

rovocation.

Douglas Johnson testified that he came to

tah to be reunited with his wife and children and take
hem back to Kentucky (T. 236).

It was his belief that

e was still married to Gwendolyn Johnson (T. 252), and
e testified that he was still in love with her (T. 242).
e saw his wife come out of the beauty school and get
nto

a car with two men in it, and he watched for about

ifteen minutes while his wife "hugged and kissed" the
irver of the car (T. 233).

The appellant's description

f the shooting was evidence of his confused and disori-

state of mind at the time of the shooting.

A. . . . [S]he run around the car and
hollered, "Sam! Sam!" and the next
thing I remember I was--this pistol was
in my hand and that and I was firing it.

Q.

What did you hear at that time?

A. I could hear--it wasn't like pistol
shots. It sounded something like an
echo way off down the street somewheres
else. Not really--not a reality close
to me.

Q.

When did you pull the gun?

A.

I don't really remember.

Q.

Was it before or after the yelling?

A. I--I don't remember. It must have
been when she started screaming and
- 3-

running around the car. I don't
remember exactly.
(T. 233-234)
The expert testimony of Dr. Ha.rold Cutler, a
clinical psychologist, was offered to show the diminished responsibility of the appellant at the time of
the shooting (T. 282-283).

Dr. Cutler's conclusion

was that the appellant had lost control over himself

and his abilities were seriously impaired (T. 283, 289).

Douglas Johnson was entitled to a fair and careful

.

letermination of the degree of his offense and the approppunishment or treatment.

This brief points to

:hree specific errors in the trial of Douglas Johnson
1hich prevented him from obtaining the degree of justice
1hich the laws of Utah require.

ARGUMENT
FDINT I
THE PROCESS OF JURY SELECTION LIMITED
THE JURORS TO PROPERTY OWNERS AND RESULTED IN AN EXCLUSION OF MARRIED
WOMEN FROM THE JURY LIST THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF HIS SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A FAIR
TRIAL, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
Jury selection in Utah is governed by statute.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-46-14 (1953) provides for the

Jury commission to select persons "of good repute for

iritelligenc e and honesty," and that in making the juror
-4-

r

01ections

the corrunissioner "will endeavor to promote only

he impartial administration of justice."

More specific-

lly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-17 (1953) requires jury

to select the names of "the legal voters on
he assessment roll of the county."

carry the statutory interpretation to its proper
onclusion Utah Code Ann. § 59-8-1 (1953) provides for
he keeping of the "assessment roll" and defines it as the.
ook in which the "total valuation of all property" is reoroed.

And Utah Code Ann. § 59-3-1 (1953) expressly

rovides that "property" is to include personal property
s 1vell as real property.
The net effect of the Utah statutes pertaining to
ury selection is a requirement that the jury corrunissioner

elect jurors from both the real and personal property
ssessmen t rolls.
TI1e evidence in this case shows that the jury was
robably selected from only the assessment roll of real
'roperty owners; at least, the State failed to show that
0th rolls were used when the method of selection was

1

:hallenged by the defense (T. 6-20).
Appellant submits that the statutory scheme of
iury selection in Utah is unconstitutional.

The require-

nent that jurors be selected from the assessment rolls
- 5-

; a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Jurteenth Amendment.

Two significant cases were

ecently decided by the Supreme Court of the United

tates, and the effect of those decisions was to render
tatutes such as Utah's jury selection statutes uncontitutional.
v. Jury Commission, 396

u.s.

320 (1970) was

he first case to reach the Supreme Court in which an

.ttack upon alleged discrimination in choosing juries was
ade seeking affirmative relief, rather than challenging
udgrnents of criminal conviction on the ground of
ystematic exclusion of Negroes from the juries.

The

ourt reasoned that defendants in criminal proceedings are
ot the only persons with a cognizable legal interest in
ondiscriminatory jury selection.

The Court stated:

Whether jury service be deemed a right,
a privilege, or a duty, the State may
no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to others on racial
grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and withholding
of the elective franchise. Once the
State chooses to provide grand and petit
juries, whether or not constitutionally
required to do so, it must hew to federal
constitutional criteria in ensuring that
the selection of membership is free of
racial bias. Id. at 330.
1he constitutional rule stated in the Carter case
-6-

3

that a State must adhere to federal constitutional

riteria in its selection of grand and petit juries.

The Carter decision becomes especially relevant
J

the case at hand when considered in conjunction with

ts c:ompanion case, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
he Turner case involved a challenge to the constitutionlity of the statutory system used in many counties in
eorgia to select juries and school-boards.

The appellants urged that the limitation of schooloard membership to

11

freeholders 11 violated the Equal

'rotection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ontended that Georgia must demonstrate a

11

They

compelling"

nteres t in support of its freeholder requirement for
chool-board membership.

The Court found it unnecessary

:o decide whether the State must show a

11

compelling 11 in-

:eres t, "because the Georgia freeholder requirement must
'all even when measured by the traditional test for a
lenial of equal protection:

whether the challenged

rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
lchievement of a valid state objective."

Id. at 362.

The Court declared that although the appellants may

"have no right to be appointed" to the school-board,
"the appellants and the members of their class do have a
federal constitutional right to be considered for public
- 7-

without the burden of invidiously discriminatory
.squalif ica tions."

Id. at 362.

The Court then considered the freeholder requireint and failed to find any rational state interest underiing the requirement.

The conclusion of the Court was

1at a ci ti::en "in all other respects qualified to sit on
school board" cannot be disqualified merely on the
asis that he does not own real property.

The State

annot presume that a citizen whose estate is less than
reehold lacks the qualities to be a school-board member.
The State of Utah cannot presume that a person who
snot listed on the assessment rolls lacks the qualities

o serve on a jury.

The Utah statute on jury selection

reates a situation whereby a person who purchased a
railer license is qualified to serve on a jury, but a
.essee who effectively pays the property tax of his
.essor as part of his rent may not be considered for jury
iervice.

This amounts to an invidious discrimination,

:herefore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-17 (1953) is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
lmendment.

The record in this case reflects that the

iury was limited to property owners on the tax assessment

rans.

This was unconstitutional
-8-

without more

ing shown.

Turner v. Fouche, supra.

In State v. Beasley, 22 Utah 2d 423, 454 P.2d 880
.969), the defendant was convicted of grad larceny and

e appealed on the basis of improper jury selection.

1

iis court held that in selecting names for a master jury
.st, the jury commission "should not have limited its
!lection to persons whose names appeared on the assessent roll or real property, but rather the Commission shou
ive made its selection from the assessment roll of both

eal and personal property."

22 Utah 2d at 42 5.

The Court affirmed the conviction, however, because
here had been an extensive hearing in the trial court on
he matter of jury selection and the defendant had failed
o show that she had been prejudiced by the deficiencies.
tis important to note that the trial court in this case

id not have an extensive hearing on the issue of imprope1
ury selection, rather the court merely overruled the

efendant' s objection to the manner of selection.

The

'ourt in this case heard no evidence as to the prejudiciaJ
!ffect of the jury selection deficiencies.

The

lpinion of Justice Ellett in Beasley, although it appears
:o be contrary to appellant's argument in this case,
actually provides support for the contention that the

-9-

ry was improperly selected.

Justice Ellett interpreted

al: Code Ann. § 76-46-17 as permitting the selection of
ospective jurors from either the roll of real estate
111ers or the personal property roll.

Appellant does

,: agree with that statutory interpretation, since it
; contrary to the federal Constitution, but does agree
lth clustice Ellett' s concluding statement:

Tile work of the jury commissioners in
selecting some 2,000 potential jurors
as required by statute involves a
great deal of time and effort; and when
they have selected a list consisting of
competent, fair, and impartial men and
women, their work should not be held for
naught merely because there was another
method which might have been used. 454
P.2d at 883 (emphasis added).
Justice Ellett admits that the jury list should
onsist of men and women, but this is inconsistent with
is position allowing a method of jury selection which
liminates nearly every woman in the county from those
onsidered for jury duty.

A jury selected from only

he assessment rolls does not meet the requirement that

:he jury be comprised "men and women".
There is some confusion in the testimony as to
the jury list was taken off of only the real

!roperty assessment roll or a combination personal and

real property assessment roll.
-10-

In any event, it is

ear that married women holding title jointly with
eir husbands were conspicuously and systematically

-

:eluded from the property assessment roll and conseently the jury list (T. l5 and l8).

1

This exclusion

isulted in a gross underrepresentation of women on
ie jury list, as evidenced by the jury empanelled for
1is case.

Fifty men and only six women were on the

mel, and the jury was finally comprised of twelve males
a male alternate.
It cannot be argued that the jury commissions did
ot specifically intend to exclude women from the Tooele

aunty jury lists.

The jury commissioners must be held

ohave intended the natural result which flowed from
heir conduct.

As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his

eparate opinion in Cassell v. State of Texas, 339

u. S.

82 (1950):

If one factor is uniform in a continuing
series of events that are brought to pass
through human intervention, the law would
have to have the blindness of impartiality
not to attribute the uniform factor to
man's purpose. The purpose may not be evil
intent or in conscious disregard of what
is conceived to be a binding duty. Prohibited conduct may result from misconception of what duty requires. Id. at 293.
tn United States v. Greenberg, 200 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.
N.;,, 1961),

the court stated:
-ll-

TI:e test is not whether voter registration
lists are used, exclusively or otherwise,
as a source of qualified jurors. The test
is whether or not the use of such lists
sources]
in an array
which is a representative cross-section
of the community or from which a cognizable group or calss of qualified citizens is
systematically excluded.
Id. at 395.
omen are definitely a cognizable class of qualified
itizens.

Their extreme underrepresentation on the

ury list for the trial of Douglas Johnson amounted to
denial of his constitutional rights of due process
nd equal protection of the laws.

In Rabinowitz v.

pited States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966), the court
ointed out that the United States Constitution places
n affirmative duty on the jury commissioner to use a
ystem that will result in a fair cross-section of the
'1mnunity being placed on the jury rolls.

The consti-

itional mandate is in the Sixth Amendment right to
rial by jury and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
fdue process and equal protection.
nited States, 329

u.s.

In Ballard v.

187 (1946) the Supreme Court

!ld that it was reversible error to exclude women from
he federal grand and petit jury panels.

It was argued

Ythe government that an all male panel drawn from the
arious groups within a community will be as truly
epresentative as if women were included.
isagreed:

-12-

The Court

The truth is that the two sexes are not
a_community made up exclusively
of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of
one in the other is among the imponderables . . . The exclusion of one (sex)
may indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would be true
if an economic or racial group were excluded.
Id. at 193-194.
n Ballard the court also speaks to the issue whether the

lefendant need show a prejudicial effect from the deficiocy in jury selection.

[T]he exclusion of women from jury panels
may at times be highly prejudicial to the
defendants. But reversible error does
not depend on a showing of prejudice in
an individual case. The evil lies in
the admitted exclusion of an eligible
class or group in the community in disregard of the prescribed standards of
jury selection . . . The injury is not
limited to the defendant--there is injury to the jury system, to the law as
an institution, to the community at
large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.
Id. at 195.
The

rudiments of a properly selected jury were

uccinctly stated by Mr. Justice Murphy in Glasser v.
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) as follows:
Our notions of what a proper jury is
have developed in harmony with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government .
[T]he proper functioning of the
system, and, indeed our democracy itself requires that the jury be a "body
-13-

truly representative of the community"
Id. at 85.
It would be appropriate to consider the recorrunen-

tions of the American Bar Association Project on
.nimwn Standards for Criminal Justice in the area of

ry selection, which are as follows:

1

Selection of prospective jurors.
The selection of prospective jurors
should be governed by the following general principles:
2.1

(a) The names of the persons who
may be called for jury service should be
selected at random from sources which
will furnish a representative cross-section of the community.
(b) Jury officials should determine
the qualifications of prospective jurors
by questionnaire or interview, and disqualify those who fail to meet specified
minimum requirements. The grounds for
disqualification should be clearly stated
objective criteria, such as:
(i) inability to read, write,
speak, and understand the English language;
(ii) incapacity by reason of
mental or physical infirmity, to render
efficient jury service;
(iii) failure to meet reasonable
requirements concerning citizenship, residence, or age; and
(iv) pending charge or conviction
of a felony or a crime involving moral
turpitude . . . . [American Bar Association
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice, "Standards Relating to Trial by
Jury," Approved Draft, 1968.]
le

disqualifying factors listed do not relate to the
-14-

:squalification imposed in this case.
The important consideration for this court, though,
; that Douglas Johnson was tried by a jury which was
ita "fair cross-section of the community."

This con-

:itutes a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to
fair trial by jury as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
nendment 1 s protection of due process and equal protecion of the law.

Appellant submits that this is rever-

ible error and a new trial must be granted.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE GRUESOME
COLOR PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CORPSE OF THE
DECEASED WHEN THE INFLAMMATORY NATURE
AND PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF SUCH PHOTOGRAPHS OVER-SHADOWED ANY POSSIBLE PROBATIVE VALUE WITH RESPECT TO A FACT IN ISSUE.
fluring the trial of Douglas Johnson, the State
1troduced into evidence color photographs of the corpse
f Gwendolyn Johnson as support for the oral testimony
I

Doctor James T. Wes ton ( T. 98-108).

The photos

discussed and shown to the jury in reference to
le

trajectory of the various bullets.
Appellant contends that the pictures served no
purpose.

Doctor Weston testified orally as

jthe cause of death, number of wounds, angles of
ntranr-e
·
an d exi· t , etc .

Hi·s testi"mony was completely
-15-

jequate to establish those facts, and they were not
Jntested by the defense.

Douglas Johnson also ad-

itted shooting his wife, and did not attempt to argue
rom what angle he did it.
·1

The cause of death was not

dispute.
?rofessed explanations adide, the State's intro-

iction of the pictures would only inflame and anger
1e jury.
1

The pictures would eliminate any willingness

the part of the jury to understand and consider

)pellant 1 s defense of insanity.
In State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512
.968), this court said:

Initially it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to
determine whether the inflammatory
nature of such slides is outweighed
by their probative value with respect
to a fact in issue. If the latter,
they may be admitted even though
gruesome. In the instant case they
had no probative value. All the
material facts which could conceivably have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been established
by uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The only purpose served was
to inf lame and arouse the jury. 21
Utah 2d at 117.
The Poe holding applies to the case at hand.
Pellant' s only contest to the charge against him was
sect on legal insanity.

All the material facts of the

had been established by uncontradicted lay and
-16-

0ical testimony.

The pictures in no way related to a

mtested fact.
In State v. Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P.2d 490
[969), this court's opinion appears to modify the Poe

In Jackson, the court ruled that a gruesome
Lide showing bullet holes in a corpse was admissible,
tying:

[A]ll of which is proper as showing
the viciousness of the assault and
the depravity of the defendant in
making it. 22 Utah 2d at 410.
Viciousness and depravity were not at issue in
tis trial.

Admittedly, Utah Code Ann. § 76- 30- 3

.953) which sets out the acts constituting murder in
1e

first degree, does include "any act greatly danger-

1s

to the lives of others and evidencing a 'depraved

nd,' regardless of human life."

This is the only

terence to "depravity" in the statute defining the
grees of murder.

The case was not tried on the

sis of the above-quoted section of the statute and
instruction was requested or given with reference
"a dangerous act evidencing a depraved mind."

The

Vious intent of the statutory language is to include

murder in the first degree acts such as bombings or
ring a weapon in to a crowd.
-17-

Viciousness also was not at issue in this trial.
ciousness is not an element of murder in the first
gree, nor is it an element of a lesser offense.

Often

ernost calm, oddly reasonable killings are murder in
e first degree, while an extremely vicious killing, as
mutual combat, may only be manslaughter.
rurthermore, the condition of the body has no protive value in assessing the degree of viciousness or
pravity involved in the killing.

In this case, one

the most disturbing as pee ts of the photographs of
endolyn ,Johnson is the grostesque expression on her
:e in death.
Jn

Such expression is, of course, no reflec-

of the manner of killing, it is happenstance.
The probative value of the color photographs was
in comparison to their inflammatory nature and pre-

licial effect, which would be to dilute the evidence
lating to diminished responsibility or provocation, and
tir admission constitutes reversible error.
POINT III
JURY INSTRUCTION 12(A) WAS CONFUSING AND
MISLEADING AND SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The trial judge gave the following jury instruction
insanity as a defense:
-18-

INSTRUCTION NO. 12(A)
The defendant, in his defense, had pleaded
contends
he is not guilty of any
crime
in the Information, because,
at the time the act was committed, he,
the defendant, was insane.
Insanity may be a complete defense to
a criminal act, or it may reduce the degree
of offense, or it may have no bearing upon
the
of guilt.
Insanity is an element in determining
questions of guilt of or punishment from
crime only when it renders the person so
affected irresponsible or partly irresponsible. That is, the defendant cannot be
convicted of a crime, if, at the time of
the act, he was insane to such an extent:
1.
That he did not know the nature of
the act; that is, did not know he had a
revolver, that it may be loaded, or that,
if discharged, it might injure or kill; or
2. That, when he fired the shot, he
did not know it was wrong in the sense
that such act was condemned by morals or
law; or
3.
That he was unable, by reason of
mental disease, to control his actions or
impulses to injure or kill Gwendolyn
Johnson.
If the defendant was afflicted with a
disease or disorder of the mind at the
time of the alleged offense in any one
or more of the three manners described
above, then, in such case, he was not
legally responsible and is entitled to
an acquittal. (Emphasis added.)
A. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF INSTRUCTION
12(A) ON THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY.
Paragraph two of Instruction 12(A) states that
nsanity may be a complete defense to a criminal act,
-19-

II

I'

may reduce the degree of offense, or it may have
, bearing upon the question of guilt."

Such a statement

;, of cou re, incorrect and mis leading.

11

precise and singular legal meaning.

Insanity" has

If the jury finds

at the defendant was "insane" at the time of the

1

'fense, it is a complete defense to a criminal act and
must be acquitted.
It is appellant's contention that the jury could
.sily have concluded that a finding of "insanity" could
·used as a basis for reducing the degree of the offense.
at is precisely what the quoted paragraph asserts.
Further misleading the jury, the Instruction states
at ninsanity is an element in determining questions of
ilt of or punishment from crime only when it renders

e person so affected irresponsible or partly irresponble."

The statenent is patently false.

"Insanity" is

complete defense and is not an element in determining
uestions of punishment from crime."

The inference of

e phrase is that "insanity" could be used as a basis
r reducing the degree of offense and, consequently,
ssening the "punishment from crime."

A finding of

sanity is a finding that the defendant was totally
responsible not "partly irresponsible."
-20-

The instruction

I

; contrary and contradictory.
Thereafter, with this confusing and misleading
1troduction,

Instruction 12(A) then gave the precise

ifinition of legal insanity.

Appellant submits that

istructions allowed the jury to find that the defendant
is legally insane, and yet to suggest that this only
lUld go to degree of guilt.
It might be argued that Instruction 12(A) is saved
•om error by its last paragraph which correctly states

1e law.

Such an argument must be rejected.

This Court

1led in Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349,
5 (1927) and State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177,
3

that the giving of conflicting instructions

ich could mislead or confuse the jury was reversible

ror, because of the impossibility of determining which
structions the jury may have followed.

B. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF INSTRUCTION
12(A) ON THE DEFENSE OF DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY.
The trial judge gave Instruction 12(C) on the
sue of diminished responsibility.

The thrust of the

struction was that when an individual "suffers from a
ntal disease or condition which fails to make out legal
sanity it may nevertheless be considered where it is
such a nature as to reasonably affect the ability of
-21-

e individual to form the particular intent necessary
comrni t a crime. 11
This instruction was critical to the appellant's

fense of diminished responsibility.

But, the giving

'.nstruction 12 (A) could have completely eliminated a

nsideration of Instruction 12(C) by the jury.

In any

ent, Instruction 12 (C) was seriously diluted and consing because of the errors in Instruction 12 (A).
As discussed earlier, the jury could easily have
ncluded that a finding of insanity would be required
order to reduce the degree of offense.

If the jury

s so misled by the error in Instruction 12 (A) the effect
uld be to require a finding of insanity in Instruction
(C) for the mitigating effect of mental illness on the

wity of criminality.

A fair appraisal of the evidence would indicate

it diminished responsibility was the crux of the
s defense.

If the error in Instruction 12(A)

Jseci the jury to ignore Instruction 12 (C), this would
disastrous to the appellant's best defense.

Whether

followed 12(A) or 12(C) is not open for conjecre.

This court's rule of State v. Green, supra, and
Anselmo requires a ruling that the case be re-

rsed and remanded for a new trial·
-22-

C.

THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF INSTRUCTION

12(A) ON THE DEFENSE OF PROVOCATION.

There was evidence offered to show that Douglas
1hnson may have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
e theory of the defense was that the shooting was pro-

1

1ked by his wife 1 s "hugging and kissing" another man, and
1e

killing was performed in the heat of passion.
Douglas Johnson's mental condition on March 25, 1969

,s of critical importance to the outcome of his trial.

.s reasons for coming to Tooele, Utah, his mental health,
id his reaction to his wife's behavior with another man

!re all under scrutiny during the trial.
Jury Instruction 12(A) focused on his mental condi.on at the exact moment the shooting occurred.

If this

used the jury to ignore the surrounding circumstances
id ether facts relevant to the appellant's mental con-

tion on the day of the shooting, then the instruction
in error in that res pee t also.
This point of argument is based on the existence
the misleading second paragraph of Instruction 12 (A)·
luntary Manslaughter is a lesser offense, and the

1

.ry could have been under the misconception that the

!fendant would have to be legally insane in order to
!duce the offense to manslaughter.
-23-

This could result

a failure by the jury to even consider the issue of
ovocation or "heat of passion. 11

POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE FOREGOING
ERRORS DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF A FAIR
TRIAL.
Each of the foregoing issues presents sufficient
ound upon which this court could reverse the trial
urt judgment and grant the appellant a new trial.

How-

er, should the court hold that no issue by itself conirutes reversible error, there is a self-imposed duty
on this court to "scrutinize with care the propriety
all aspects of the proceeding."

State v. St. Clair,

Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 322 (1955).
It has been recognized by this court that there mCo/
several errors in a trial, and each error standing
one will not be sufficiently prejudicial to merit a
versal, but when each error is viewed in conjunction
th the other errors the cumulative effect may amount
the denial of a fair trial.
=ih 444, 121 p, 903 (1942).

State v. Vasquez, 101
This position was reaffirmed

v. St. Clair, supra at 243.
It is recognized that a combination of
errors which, when singly considered
might be thought insufficient to warrant
-24-

a reversal, might in their cumulative
effect do so.

A review of the record shows that the afore-menJned errors, when examined as to their cumulative
feet, prevented the appellant from receiving a fair

ial.

The jury selection was the first error and possibly
e most prejudicial to the appellant.

The effect of the

proper selection process, which limited the jurors to
operty owners, was to exclude from the jury list almost
1 married women.

11

1j

l'1

!

Whether such an exclusion was pre-

,;

dicial to the defendant is irrelevant, and is imposble of proof.
j

What is important is that a cognizable

significant section of the community, was excluded andi

erefore, the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to trial
jury and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process
j

equal protection have been denied.
The improper jury selection, by itself, constitutes

versible error.

When considered in conjunction with

e trial court's abuse of discretion by admitting into
idence the gruesome and gory colored photographs of
e deceased, the cumulative effect of those errors reire the granting of a new trial.

The inflammatory

ture and prejudicial effect of such photographs over-25-

1,1

actowed any possible probative value with respect to a
ct in issue.
The above errors provide ample ground for reversal
d remand for a new trial, but when the giving of the
.sleading and contradictory jury instruction is con.dered along with the improper jury selection and admis-

1

.on into evidence of the inflarmnatory photographic
•idence the cumulative effect of those errors compel
1is court to grant the appellant a new and a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
The appellant submits that the trial court's conction must be reversed.

The selection of the jury

ich tried the appellant did not meet constitutional
andards and per se requires reversal.

The considera-

ons of improper evidence and confusing instructions
ven the jury by trial court add to the magnitude of
eerror and require reversal and a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Ronald N. Boyce
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
College of Law
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

-26-

1

